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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103. Jurisdiction 
has been challenged by Respondent. The Court made a final determination that it 
has jurisdiction to review the matter in its Order of June 18, 2008. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case is a direct appeal from the final determination of the South Jordan 
Employee Appeals Board issued on April 30, 2007. Petitioner commenced this 
action by filing a Petition for Review in the Court of Appeals on May 10, 2007. On 
September 10, 2007, the Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Third District 
Court under Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. On June 16, 2008, 
the Court set aside the transfer and reinstated the appeal. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the South Jordan Employee Appeals Board misinterpret Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and erroneously conclude that Daniel Pearson was an at-
will employee during his employment as Assistant Police Chief of South Jordan 
City? 
Standard of Review: Legal conclusions and mistakes of law are reviewed 
under a correctness standard, without deference to the administrative agency. See 
1 
Utah County v. Alexander son, 71 P.3d 621 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); State v. Barrett, 
127 P.3d 682 (Utah 2005). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Terms of Employment at Hiring 
Prior to July 15, 2002, Respondent recruited Mr. Pearson for the position of 
Assistant Police Chief. Mr. Pearson was told that it was a merit position, whereby 
he could only be terminated for cause (i.e. for misconduct). See Excerpts of 
Appeals Board Hearing Transcript, pg. 12-14, 33 (attached herein at Exhibit A).1 
On July 15, 2002, Respondent "officially" extended a written offer of employment. 
See Employment Contract (attached herein at Exhibit B); see also Exhibit A, pg. 14-
16, 82, 84-88.2 The offer stated that only "Probationary and Department Heads" 
were employed at-will. Id. Throughout his employment Mr. Pearson's superior, 
Police Chief Lindsay Shepherd, made statements confirming Mr. Pearson's merit 
status. See Exhibit A, pg. 16-17, 31. 
B. Termination of Employment 
On January 30, 2007, Respondent, through City Manager Rick Horst, 
lrThe portions of the transcript provided in Exhibit A are merely examples of evidence 
concerning the point at issue. The Exhibit does not contain all of the relevant portions of the transcript. 
2
 All Exhibits to this Brief are part of the record before the Court. 
2 
terminated Mr. Pearson from his position without cause or explanation. Mr. 
Pearson was immediately asked to sign a waiver of any right to appeal the 
termination, which he declined to do. See Id. Mr. Horst issued Mr. Pearson a 
termination letter stating that the termination was based on his "at-will" status. See 
Termination Letters (attached herein at Exhibit C). The following day, Mr. Pearson 
gave Respondent notice that he would appeal Respondent's claim that he was an 
"at-will" employee. Respondent, again through Mr. Horst, issued a response letter 
on February 8, 2007, informing Mr. Pearson that his at-will status was mandated by 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. See Exhibit C. 
C. Internal Appeals 
In accordance with Respondent's written grievance procedure, Mr. Pearson 
appealed the termination to his immediate supervisor, Police Chief Lindsay 
Shepherd, then to Assistant City Manager, John Geilmann, and finally to 
Respondent's Employee Appeals Board. See Dan Pearson Grievances (attached 
herein at Exhibit D). Both Lindsay Shepherd and John Geilman affirmed Mr. 
Horst's position without explanation. See Respondent's Denial Letters (attached 
herein at Exhibit E). In fact, they labeled Mr. Pearson an "appointed" at-will 
employee. See Id. 
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On April 27, 2007, the Appeals Board held a quasi-judicial hearing. Both 
parties offered testimony and were entitled to cross-examination. Respondent's 
attorney, Assistant City Manager John Geilmann, stipulated that Mr. Pearson's 
termination was without cause and that it was based entirely on Mr. Pearson's 
alleged at-will status. See Exhibit A, pg. 19-20. His questions and statements 
focused on Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and its legal significance. See Id., pg. 25-
26, 38. On April 30, 2007, the Appeals Board issued a final determination that Mr. 
Pearson was an at-will employee during his service as Assistant Police Chief and 
upheld his termination. See Exhibit E. 
D. Exclusive Basis for Final Determination 
Unfortunately, the Appeals Board's final decision did not offer a clear 
statement of its factual and legal analysis. This suggests that the Appeals Board's 
decision was based solely on Mr. Horst's original conclusion that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-3-1105 mandates Mr. Pearson's at-will status. Had the Appeals Board based 
its determination on the factual evidence presented at the hearing, it would have 
addressed those facts in the decision. 
Respondent confirmed that the decision was based on Mr. Horst's orginal 
statutory interpretation on December 14, 2007, when it filed its Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Disposition of Appeal (attached herein at Exhibit 
4 
F). The Memorandum sets forth two interpretations of § 10-3-1105. First, 
Respondent believes that for purposes of § 10-3-1105, "assistant police chiefs" are 
the same as "deputy police chiefs." See Exhibit F. Second, Respondent believes 
that § 10-3-1105 mandates the at-will status of all municipal "deputy police chiefs." 
See Id. Accordingly, Respondent concludes that Mr. Pearson, a municipal 
Assistant Police Chief, was mandatorily an at-will employee. This explains why 
Respondent has never acknowledged or addressed Mr. Pearson's compelling 
evidence. Under Respondent's legal interpretations, no set of facts can change the 
statutory mandate. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I: Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 protects Mr. Pearson from being an 
at-will employee. Section 10-3-1105 protects all municipal positions not 
specifically excluded. Section 10-3-1105 excludes "deputy" police chiefs, but 
does not exclude "assistant" police chiefs. The plain language of the statute 
demonstrates that these two titles are distinct. 
Point II: Even if Mr. Pearson were a deputy police chief for purposes of 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105, there is no mandate that he be an at-will employee. 
Section 10-3-1105 confers rights on certain municipal employees, it does not take 
away or limit the rights of others. Municipalities may still give deputy police chief 
5 
employment rights above those of an at-will employee, including full merit 
employee status. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD INCORRECTLY 
INTERPRETED UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-1105 AND 
ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT Mr. PEARSON 
WAS AN AT WILL EMPLOYEE. 
1. Respondent's Appeals Board Erroneously Concluded that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-3-1105 Did Not Protect Mr. Pearson. 
Subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(1) reads as follows: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a 
municipality shall hold employment without limitation of time, being 
subject to discharge, suspension of over two days without pay, or 
involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as 
provided in Section 10-3-1106. 
(emphasis added). 
The corollary statute, § 10-3-1106, lists several specific limitations on a 
municipality's ability to terminate a municipal employee. Utah Code Ann.§ 10-3-
1106 (i.e. "may not be discharged . . . incident to, or through changes, either in the 
elective officers, governing body, or heads of departments." Because an at-will, by 
definition, does not enjoy any rights, employees protected by § 10-3-1105 cannot 
be at will. 
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The policy behind the statute seems clear: the state legislature wants to 
ensure that municipalities give their employees an adequate level of job security. 
Without statutory protection, city managers would have too much discretion and 
could begin running the city as if it were their own private business. 
Of course, there are a few positions within municipalities where too much job 
security would be counterproductive. Appointed and political positions benefit 
from a significant amount of discretion. The legislature has accounted for this in 
subsection (2) of § 10-3-1105, where eleven (11) specific positions are excluded 
from the protections otherwise granted to all municipal employees: 
(2) Section (1) does not apply to: 
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body 
exercising executive power in the municipality. 
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire 
department who is a member of the classified civil service in a 
first or second class city; 
(c) a police chief of the municipality; 
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality; 
(e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality; 
(g) a head of a municipal department; 
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department; 
(i) a superintendent; 
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or 
(1) a seasonal employee of the municipality. 
(emphasis added). 
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Respondent relies on its own interpretation of § 10-3-1105 to conclude that 
Mr. Pearson is among those excluded from subsection (1). It believes that, for 
purposes of the statute, a "deputy police chief is the same as an "assistant police 
chief." Respondent would say that subsection (2) should be read as stating: 
"Subsection (1) does not apply to . . . (d) a deputy or assistant police chief of the 
municipality." This meshing of the term deputy and assistant is inconsistent with 
the express distinctions of the statute, other sections of the Utah Code, and 
Respondent's own employment structure. 
Immediately following subsection (2)'s listing of excluded positions within 
the police force, it lists the excluded positions within the fire department: 
(e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality; 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The statute makes a specific distinction between "deputies" and "assistants." 
Clearly, the drafters would not have placed the additional language or assistant into 
the statute were the two positions identical. If the distinction was inserted for mere 
clarification (i.e. to make sure the reader understands that assistants are included), it 
would have made a similar statement in its reference to deputy police chiefs. The 
inclusion of assistants in referencing fire chiefs and not police chiefs demonstrates 
8 
that the exclusion of assistant police chiefs was intentional. 
Distinctions between assistants and deputies are found throughout the Utah 
Code. For example, § 77-23a-8 references "assistant attorney general/' despite 
referring to several other positions as deputies: 
(1) The attorney general of the state, any assistant attorney general 
specially designated by the attorney general, any count attorney, 
district attorney, deputy county attorney, or deputy district attorney 
specifically designated by the county attorney or by the district 
attorney, may . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8. 
These same distinctions are found in other position's within Respondent's 
municipality. For example, Respondent's appointed employees include Gary 
Whatcott as Deputy City Manager and John Geilmann, Rob Wall and Laurie 
Tanner as Assistant City Managers. See List of South Jordan Appointed Positions 
(attached herein at Exhibit G). 
Respondent relies on Mr. Pearson's job description as evidence that he was 
the equivalent of a deputy police chief. See Assistant Police Chief Job Description 
(attached herein at Exhibit H). This position disregards Respondent's duty to 
observe Utah's title specific statutory scheme. A job description cannot change 
the position's title where the title has legal significance under the Utah Code. Both 
parties agree that Mr. Pearson's title was Assistant Police Chief. This title must be 
observed under the law. Employees like Mr. Pearson must be able to rely on their 
9 
title in reviewing title-specific state and local employment laws. Respondent has a 
duty to conform its titles to the law, not the other way around. 
Moreover, even if Mr. Pearson's job description were relevant, the 
description is not consistent with that of a full deputy police chief or with the type 
of position the legislature intended to exclude from § 10-3-1105. Mr. Pearson's 
title states: 
General Purpose 
Assumes total responsibility for the [police] department in the absence 
of the Public Safety Director; assists in the development of department 
programs; performs various administrative and managerial duties as 
assigned by the Chief. 
Supervision Received 
Works under the broad guidance and direction of the Public Safety 
Director. Assumes departmental responsibility in the absence of the 
Chief of Police. 
Supervision Exercised 
Provides general supervision to all department personnel, directly 
through subordinate supervisors. 
See Exhibit H. 
The title of "deputy" police chief typically connotes full authority to stand in 
and act as the police chief in the chiefs absence. See Deputy, Black's Law 
Dictionary, 8th ed. (attached herein at Exhibit I). While Mr. Pearson's job 
description gives him departmental "responsibility" in the absence of the Chief of 
10 
Police, it does not give him "authority" to stand in the Police Chiefs position. In 
fact, the language describing Mr. Pearson's responsibility over the police force is 
stronger in the absence of the Public Safety Director than in the absence of the 
Police Chief. 
Respondent's confusion regarding its own distinctions is highlighted by the 
fact that two of Respondent's denials actually label Mr. Pearson as an "appointed" 
at-will employee. Of course, Mr. Pearson has never been appointed by anyone, 
and Respondent's own list of appointees does not include Assistant Police Chief. 
See Exhibit G. 
Collectively, it is clear that the statute does not exclude Assistant Police 
Chiefs. There is no "wiggle room" to find in the alternative. 
A. Respondent's Mistake of Law Resulted in Mr. Pearson's Wrongful 
Termination. 
As a result of Respondent's mistake of law, Mr. Pearson was wrongfully 
terminated as an at-will employee. He was deprived of his statutory employment 
rights and the full merit rights independently guaranteed him by Respondent. The 
Court need not determine the exact level of protections Mr. Pearson enjoyed under 
§ 10-3-1106 or his employment contract. It is sufficient to find that he was not 
subject to "at-will" termination. No interpretation of his actual rights can change the 
11 
fact that his employment was terminated on an incorrect interpretation of the law. 
B. Appropriate Relief 
Since his termination, Respondent has not replaced Mr. Pearson with a new 
Assistant Police Chief. Reinstatement is a viable option, and is Mr. Pearson's 
preferred remedy, along with back payment for lost wages. This Court should use 
its authority to issue an order to this effect. 
2. Even if Petitioner Were A Deputy Police Chief For Purposes of Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1105, Respondent's Appeals Board Erroneously 
Concluded That The Statute Mandates His At-Will Status. 
Even if Respondent's definition of deputy police chief is not materially 
flawed, its conclusions regarding the statute's effect on deputy police chiefs are 
clearly erroneous. Respondent claims that u[u]nder Utah law, a 'deputy police 
chief and 'deputy of the head of a municipal department' are at-will employees 
and have no entitlement to due process upon termination." See Exhibit F. That is, it 
interprets the statute as removing the ability of municipalities to give deputy police 
chiefs any type of protection or merit status. Under this view, the statute could be 
read: "The positions listed in Subsection (2) shall be at-will employees, and may 
always be terminated at any time for any reason." 
Properly interpreted, the statute goes no where near stating that deputy police 
chiefs must be at-will. Section 10-3-1105 affirmatively guarantees rights to certain 
12 
employees of municipalities; it doesn't take away the rights of others. The 
excluded positions are listed only because it would be impracticable to list all of the 
protected positions. Basic logic tells us that a guarantee of rights to some 
employees from one source does not thereby preclude a guarantee of rights to all 
others from a separate source. Applied to this case, the fact that a deputy police 
chief does not get any benefit from § 10-3-1105 does not mean he or she can not 
get similar or even better benefits direct from the municipality. 
This interpretation is highlighted by the case of Kivett v. Marion County 
Sheriff's Dept, 2007 WL 906470. In Kivett, the relevant part of the statute read: 
"A special deputy may be removed by the sheriff at any time, without notice and 
without assigning any cause . . ." This language is much stronger than that of § 10-
3-1105, and at first glance appears to create an absolute at-will status. The court, 
however, refused to read into the statute anything that was not clearly stated: 
Sgt. Kivett argues that [the statute] does not bar or limit the sheriffs 
authority to enter into a contract that restricts his right to fire an 
employee at-will. This Court agrees. By stating that a sheriff "may" 
remove a special deputy at any time, without notice, and without 
assigning any cause, the Legislature was clearly stating that special 
deputies were not merit deputies, and could not claim the property 
rights that the Legislature had afforded merit deputies. . . It was not 
however, restricting the Sherifs right to bargain with non-merit 
employees. . . Had the Legislature wished a different result, it could 
have used different language, either by specifically limiting a sheriffs 
bargaining authority . . . or by writing the statute in mandatary terms 
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stating, for example, that 'a special deputy shall be removed by the 
sheriff at any time, without notice and without assigning any cause. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The Kivett decision was based on the important principle that "in statutory 
constitution, it is just as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is 
to recognize what it does say." Id. In the present case, the statute does not say that 
deputy police chiefs are at-will employees. Indeed, it does not even approach the 
language in Kivett which held that special deputies were not "merit employees." 
Correctly interpreted, § 10-3-1105 has no real effect on the employment status of 
deputy police chief or police chiefs at all. 
A. Respondent's Mistake of Law Resulted in Mr. Pearson's Wrongful 
Termination. 
Respondent's mistake of law caused the Appeals Board to abuse its 
discretion. At the hearing before the Employee Appeals Board, Mr. Pearson 
offered evidence that he was recruited for the position of Assistant Police Chief 
under the express agreement that he would be a merit employee. See Exhibit A, pg. 
12-16, 33, 82, 84-88; Exhibit B. The evidence included Mr. Pearson's employment 
contract which states that he was not at-will. Id. Respondent had an obligation to 
consider and make findings regarding this evidence, which it did not under the 
mistaken belief that the evidence was irrelevant. 
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The evidence in the record is sufficient to make a finding that Mr. Pearson, 
even if not protected by 10-3-1105, had negotiated for and received a level of 
protected status. The exact degree of Mr. Pearson's employment rights is 
irrelevant. As long as Mr. Pearson was not an at-will employee, his at-will based 
termination was wrongful. If Respondent wishes to pursue termination on 
permissible grounds, it can only do so after restoring Mr. Pearson to his pre-
termination status. 
B. Appropriate Relief 
As previously indicated, Mr. Pearson's preferred remedy is full reinstatement 
along with payment of lost wages and other appropriate relief This Court should 
use its authority to issue an order to this effect.3 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing arguments, Mr. Pearson respectfully requests that this 
Court overturn his termination and grant appropriate relief as requested herein. 
(Signature Line of Following Page) 
3In the event that the Court agrees that there was a mistake of law and abuse of discretion, but 
does not agree that the record demonstrates that he was not an at-will employee, the appropriate 
remedy would be to remand the matter back to the Appeals Board for review in accordance with the 
correct interpretations of law. 
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Dated this / j ^ d a y of August, 2008. 
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE, L.L.C. 
^ ( D , ^ 
Gregory G. Skordas 
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Exhibit A 
Excerpts of Trial Transcript 
1 A. 1986, possibly. I'm not sure. 
2 Q. '86? 
3 A. '96, I'm sorry. 1996. 
4 Q. So you would have been Assistant Chief for 
5 approximately six years. Does that sound about 
6 right? 
7 A. I think so. 
8 Q. Just tell the Board what you did generally 
9 as Assistant Chief of Police for Midvale City. 
10 A. I handled operations, did all the 
11 day-to-day operations, did the daily purchasing and 
12 general budget management, handled disciplinary 
13 issues, was over scheduling, took complaints from 
14 citizens. I dealt with all of the operational issues 
15 of the police department. 
16 Q. And Midvale was a growing city at that 
17 time. In fact, did Midvale City incorporate the Fort 
18 Union area while you were there? 
19 A. Yeah. I oversaw the annexation of the 
20 Fort Union area and handled all of the preparations 
21 for that. It was a very large annexation. 
22 Q. And was your involvement in that in any 
23 way connected with your coming over to South Jordan 
24 City? 
25 A. A little bit. 
CITICOURT, LLC 
1 Q. How did that take place? 
2 A. I had had some conversations with the 
3 Chief of Police, Lindsey Shepherd. He had let me 
4 know that this position was available and that they 
5 were growing rapidly and that I had some of the 
6 qualifications that he thought would be good for the 
7 job. 
8 Q. So when did your dialogue with Lindsey 
9 Shepherd start? 
10 A. Sometime probably around the first of the 
11 year, 2002, I would guess. 
12 Q. And who contacted who? 
13 A. We were at a meeting together and he 
14 mentioned it. And we had some dialogue about it, 
15 talked about the position and what it was going to 
16 entai 1. 
17 Q. And what was your understanding or 
18 actually what was the conversation with respect to 
19 the position? 
20 A. Just that South Jordan was growing rapidly 
21 and that they were ready now to put on an Assistant 
22 Chief of Police position; that it entailed basically 
23 a lot of the duties that I was currently doing, I 
24 had expressed to him during several of those 
25 conversations that I wasn't interested in being a 
CITICOURT, LLC 
1 I Chief of Police and that being Assistant Chief of 
2 I Police was what I was comfortable doing and what I 
3 enjoyed and that I may be interested in the job. 
4 Q. And why would you not have wanted to be a 
5 Chief of Police? 
6 A. I made it clear to Lindsey early on that 
7 I - and in several subsequent conversations - that I 
8 was not interested in being a Chief of Police. It 
9 was too volatile a position, and that I wasn't going 
10 to give up job security to do that. 
11 Q. What do you mean by "job security"? 
12 A. A Chief of Police serves at the will of 
13 the city and can be terminated without cause for 
14 whatever reason. And I wasn't interested in having 
15 that type of position. 
16 Q. Do you understand the concept of what's 
17 called a merit or nonmerit employee? 
18 A. I do. 
19 Q. And when you worked at Midvale City, what 
20 was your understanding as to your status there? 
21 A. I had a signed agreement that was very 
22 definitive that explained exactly what my position 
23 was. When I took the Assistant Chief of Police job I 
24 had the permanent secured rank of lieutenant. So had 
25 they removed me from the assistant police job for any 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
1 reason other than misconduct, I would have gone back 
2 to the rank of lieutenant. 
3 Q. Okay. And why would you have left that 
4 type of job security to come over to South Jordan? 
5 A. I understood that when I came here, I knew 
6 that there would be a probationary period. I 
7 understand very clearly that a probationary employee 
8 can be let go for whatever reason during probation. 
9 I was confident that I could complete, successfully 
10 complete, probation and that I could do the job. And 
11 I believed wholeheartedly that as soon as that 
12 probation was completed, that my position would no 
13 longer be an at-will employee, that I could just go 
14 down the road. And that was further reinforced by 
15 all the documents that I signed when I came here. It 
16 was very specific that department heads and 
17 probationary employees were at-will, which is exactly 
18 as I understood it. 
19 Q. Okay. And did you serve the probationary 
20 period here at South Jordan? 
21 A. I did. 
22 Q. When was that? 
23 A. In January of 2003 I received an 
24 evaluation and a notice that I had successfully 
25 completed my probation, and congratulating me on it. 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
1 Q. At that point, did you have an 
2 understanding that you were no longer an at-will or 
3 probationary employee? 
4 A. Absolutely. 
5 Q. What was that based on? 
6 A. It was based on the documents I had signed 
7 when I came to work here. It was based on 
8 conversation I had with Lindsey Shepherd concerning 
9 the position. It was based on my understanding of 
10 state law. It was based on my understanding of the 
11 way municipalities conduct business; that their 
12 department heads serve at-will. It was based on my 
13 understanding -- I had reviewed South Jordan City 
14 policies. There was nothing in a South Jordan City 
15 policy that established an at-will position for an 
16 Assistant Chief or any other supervisory capacity 
17 employee. There was nothing. And up until the time 
18 I left South Jordan City, there was nothing in City 
19 policy that differentiated the position of Assistant 
20 Chief of Police as being someone who is at-will and 
21 served at the pleasure of the city manager. 
22 Q. You talked about conversations with the 
23 Chief. Tell the Board about those conversations as 
24 they related to your status as a merit employee. 
25 A. Well, not long after I came here, the City 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
1 I decided to try this public safety concept. They made 
2 | several changes that South Jordan has done; changes, 
3 I changes, changes. But through all of this, Lindsey 
4 Shepherd was made the director of public safety. He 
5 came to me and explained in great detail that there 
6 was a real issue. He wanted me to be the acting 
7 Chief of Police but he said, "You need to understand 
8 that you're not really going to be the acting Chief 
9 of Police. It's going to be a title, because I have 
10 an issue with retirement, and I cannot go and claim 
11 to be the Director of Public Safety because it will 
12 mess up my Police Chief retirement. So I'm going to 
13 maintain the title of Police Chief. You will be an 
14 Acting Chief, and once I get the issues resolved with 
15 my retirement, then we will talk about it. So you 
16 are kind of in that position but you're really not." 
17 We had that conversation several times. I 
18 understood it. Clearly understood it. I explained 
19 to him in every conversation, as I did a subsequent 
20 conversation with Gary Whatcott, that I had no 
21 interest in giving up my job security in any way to 
22 be the Chief, so he would have to make decisions 
23 prior to that retirement issue being resolved because 
24 I had no interest in the job of Chief of Police. 
25 Q. That position as public safety for the 
CITICOURT, LLC 
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1 I ever left Midvale City? 
2 I A. Absolutely never. 
3 Q. Let's talk about your job performance 
4 while you were here at South Jordan. What can you 
5 tell the Board about that? 
6 A. Well, I'm --
7 MR. GEILMANN: Objection your Honor, or 
8 Mr. Chairman. Job performance is not an issue with 
9 an at-will employe. The determination is whether or 
10 not he is an at-will employee. And if he is an 
11 at-will employee, then any issue with regard to 
12 performance is moot. If he is not an at-will 
13 employee, that's a different issue, a different 
14 matter to be heard. 
15 MR. SKORDAS: If they are willing to 
16 stipulate that his termination had nothing in the 
17 world whatsoever to do with his performance as an 
18 employee, then we won't get into that. 
19 MR. WOLTHIUS: And I think that for 
20 purposes of this hearing, that if both sides are on 
21 the same page with respect to this being specifically 
22 focused on and dealing with the at-will issue alone, 
23 then I don't think that it's necessary to get into 
24 the job performance, either. 
25 MR. GEILMANN: That would be the position 
CITICOURT, LLC 
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1 of the City. 
2 MR. WOLTHIUS: Is that your position, Mr. 
3 Skordas? 
4 MR. SKORDAS: Not entirely. I do think it 
5 goes to credibility, and I'm just going to ask one or 
6 two questions about it. I think he is entitled to 
7 talk about that. 
8 MR. WOLTHIUS: Well, I think that if you 
9 want Mr. Pearson to state for the record that he was 
10 a good employee and never had any negative 
11 evaluations or something to that effect, I don't 
12 think we have a problem with it. But I don't think 
13 we need to spend a lot of time on it if it's just a 
14 determination of at-will. 
15 MR. SKORDAS: That's all I intend to do. 
16 MR. WOLTHIUS: Would Mr. Geilmann be 
17 willing to stipulate to that? 
18 MR. GEILMANN: I stipulate to that, your 
19 Honor. 
20 MR. WOLTHIUS: All right. Then I don't 
21 see any need to get into it. 
22 MR. SKORDAS: Okay. 
23 Q. (By Mr. Skordas) What did you do 
24 specifically for South Jordan as an Assistant Chief 
25 of Police? 
CITICOURT. LLC 
1 I CROSS EXAMINATION 
2 I BY MR. GEILMANN: 
3 Q. Chief Pearson, you indicate you were hired 
4 by the City in 2002; is that correct? 
5 A. Yes, sir. 
6 Q. And were you aware, at the time of your 
7 hire, of the state statute that dealt with public 
8 employees, particularly those who are employees of a 
9 municipality? 
10 A. Absolutely was. 
11 Q. And do you recall in 2002 that statute 
12 allowed for the termination of police officers? 
13 A, Yeah. I believe that it allowed for some 
14 of that activity. But the caveat to that is just 
15 because there's a state statute, you have to have 
16 consistent policies and procedures within the City 
17 that give general rules and guidelines for those 
18 employees. You can't single out one employee in a 
19 city and not others and have inconsistencies. South 
20 Jordan's policies and procedures are what prevail in 
21 this matter, and South Jordan's policies were silent 
22 on the i ssues. 
23 Q. We will make those as legal arguments in a 
24 few minutes. I just wanted to make sure that you 
25 understood at the time you hired, that there was a 
CITIC0URT, LLC 
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certain statute in place that controlled municipal 
employees, and particularly police officers. 
A. It said that that could be done. 
Q. That they could be released without --
that they were at-will employees? 
A. I'm not sure of the exact terminology. 
But it did allow for some people to be at-will, yes. 
Q. Very good. Thank you. Are you aware that 
that law was changed in 2004? 
A. I became aware after that law was changed 
that they had changed the law, yes. 
Q. And are you aware of what that law is 
today? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. What is your recollection of what that law 
is today? 
A. That law states that a Deputy Police Chief 
is exempt from that statute that it cites with 
regards to protection; a Deputy Police Chief or an 
Assistant Fire Chief or Deputy Fire Chief, as well as 
superintendents and several other categories of 
people. But it is silent on the issue of Assistant 
Chief of Police. 
Q. When did you become aware of that changed 
statute that took place in 2004? 
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1 I saying that your understanding was when you talked 
2 with him about not wanting to be the Chief or when 
3 you talked about your position as Acting Chief, that 
4 in your mind that meant not at-will. That was the 
5 context. 
6 DAN PEARSON: I had a very specific 
7 discussion concerning the fact that I was not willing 
8 to place myself in the position of being at-will. 
9 MR. WALL: Okay. 
10 DAN PEARSON: And made it very, very 
11 clear. And there was never any comment either from 
12 him or from Gary Whatcott when I talked to him 
13 stating, "Well, you're at-will," or something like 
14 that. Nothing whatsoever. 
15 MR. WALL: Could you just take a minute 
16 and elaborate? This is just the last question. When 
17 you said that your -- during your employment here at 
18 the City, talk to us a little bit about what was your 
19 final decision-making authority, on what types of 
20 matters, 
21 DAN PEARSON: W e l l , i t depended on what 
22 p o i n t we were a t . But b a s i c a l l y I was always i n a 
23 p o s i t i o n of o f f i c e r s r e p o r t to s e r g e a n t s , se rgean ts 
24 r e p o r t t o l i e u t e n a n t s , l i e u t e n a n t s r e p o r t e d to me. I 
25 r e p o r t e d to C h i e f Shepherd. T h a t ' s b a s i c a l l y the way 
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1 I MR. WOLTHIUS: What did you do in terms of 
2 I application for that position? 
3 DAN PEARSON: I don't recall. 
4 MR. WOLTHIUS: Do you recall if you had 
5 filled out some kind of a standard city application 
6 form or just submitted a resume or curriculum vitae? 
7 DAN PEARSON: I submitted a resume. I 
8 don't know if I did that like one-page application. 
9 I did a background packet for them and submitted that 
10 after -- you know, during the job offer stage. And 
11 again, it was during that job offer stage where it 
12 was really solidified to me that I would not be 
13 at-will because the paper I was given, signed by 
14 human resources specifically, said who was at-will 
15 employees in the City. It couldn't have been 
16 clearer. 
17 MR. WOLTHIUS: And who made the offer of 
18 employment? 
19 DAN PEARSON: It was signed by Shelly 
20 Chapman who was in charge of human resources at the 
21 ti me. 
22 MR. WOLTHIUS: Okay. And based upon that 
23 offer, you accepted the employment. 
24 DAN PEARSON: Yes, I did. 
25 MR. WOLTHIUS: And so when you terminated 
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any evidence has been presented. But I'd just like 
to walk you through this whole packet and show you 
what we have. 
MR. WOLTHIUS 
MR. GEILMANN 
MR. WOLTHIUS 
MR. GEILMANN 
That's fine. 
That' s fine? 
Uh-huh (affi rmati v e ) . 
Thank you. First, is the 
statute that's applicable in this particular issue, 
Title 10, Chapter 3, Section 1105 that deals with 
duration and termination of employment and 
exceptions. And particularly we are going to focus 
on Section 2(b) of that statute. And then it 
references, after that, 10-3-1106 which talks about 
the hearing process, et cetera, that we are in today. 
From there, I have included appropriate 
city ordinances that deal with the duties of city 
department directors and the establishment of 
management positions within the City. And then of 
course the applicable grievance procedure. This was 
the procedure that was in place at the time of the 
separation of Chief Pearson. So this would be the 
applicable process that we would be operating under. 
Any questions about that? I'll save argument for 
later, but are there any questions about what we have 
included in this packet? 
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1 I Q. And let me see if you will answer this 
2 I question: There is nowhere on this document that 
3 I reflects that Dan Pearson is an at-will employee, is 
4 there? 
5 A. That' s correct. 
6 Q. And if you turn to the next page, this 
7 two-page job description. Are you with me on that? 
8 A. I am, 
9 Q. The City wrote that up, too, didn't they? 
10 A. Someone from the City. I would assume the 
11 Police Chief. 
12 Q. And tell the Board on this job description 
13 where it says that the Assistant Police Chief is an 
14 at-will employee. Take your time. 
15 A. Thank you. 
16 I d o n ' t see a n y t h i n g r e f l e c t i n g t h a t . 
17 Q. The j o b d e s c r i p t i o n i s t i t l e d A s s i s t a n t 
18 P o l i c e C h i e f , c o r r e c t ? 
19 A. C o r r e c t . 
20 Q. You stated a minute ago that you preferred 
21 the title "Deputy Chief of Police," correct? 
22 A. I referred that I prefer the title 
23 "deputy" in general. 
24 Q. Can you produce today a document created 
25 by you during the entire five-year period that Dan 
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Pearson worked for Midvale City where you referred to 
him in any fashion at all as a Deputy Chief of 
Police? 
Excuse me. You mentioned Midvale City? 
Excuse me. South Jordan City. 
Okay. To my -- I don't have anything 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
before me. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
In fact, no such document exists, does it? 
Not to my knowledge. 
Let's go to the next page, sir. That's 
the flow chart, the pretty, colored one there. That 
certainly doesn't use your preferred language of 
"Deputy Chief of Police," does it? 
A. No. 
Q. The next page there, not quite so pretty, 
doesn't reflect your preferred title of "Deputy Chief 
of Police" anywhere, does it? 
A. It does not. 
Q. Let's go to the next page, sir, if you 
will. Does it reflect there "Deputy Chief of 
Police"? 
A. It does not. 
Q. And finally, the stationery, undated, 
doesn't reflect "Deputy Chief of Police," does it? 
A. It does not. 
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him sign it, correct? 
A. A human resource officer Shelly Chapman 
di d, yes . 
Q. And nowhere on this document does it 
reflect that Dan Pearson is an at-will employee, does 
it? 
A. As I read it, it reflects that --
Q. Show me on this document where it reflects 
that Dan Pearson is an at-will employee? 
A. All I see is that the sentence says, "You 
should know that if your employment is at-will," and 
so in my mind it doesn't say you are or that you are 
not. 
And the City drafted this document, Q. 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
Shelly Chapman apparently did, yes. 
She represented the City when she drafted 
this document, didn't she? 
A. I'm not sure how to answer that. She was 
the human resource officer. I would have some 
question as to her authority to be able to represent 
the City in that capacity. 
Q. It has the City's stationery down there on 
the bottom, correct? 
A. It does. 
CITICOURT, LLC 
o m c:i ?A/\ 1 
1 I Q. If you go to the termination letter, 
2 I January 30, 2007, that's the very first time in all 
3 of history where the words "at-will" are used in 
4 connection with Dan Pearson in any written document 
5 created by South Jordan City, correct? 
6 A. I can't answer that. I don't know. I 
7 haven't reviewed all documents. 
8 Q. Have you ever seen a document in the 
9 history of all mankind where the words "at-will" are 
10 used on a South Jordan piece of paper to refer to Dan 
11 Pearson prior to this document dated January 30, 
12 2007? 
13 A. A South Jordan piece of paper, meaning a 
14 letterhead? 
15 Q. Anything. 
16 A. Give me a moment to think. 
17 I can't recall anything. 
18 Q. You drafted this document and you were 
19 careful to use the words "at-will" on that first 
20 sentence there, weren't you? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And if you go to what apparently was filed 
23 here with the Department of Workforce Services, 
24 somebody wrote in there a discharge, "Discharge of 
25 at-will employee," and then somebody even cited the 
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1 I status. 
2 I MR. WALL: So that's why you didn't 
3 approach him with something similar to what you had 
4 in Midvale? You thought you already had it? Is that 
5 what you --
6 DAN PEARSON: It was solidified. It was 
7 as clear as day and night when I came here, and the 
8 person in charge of human resources, she was in 
9 charge of human resources and provided a form to me 
10 that I and her both signed, and it spelled it right 
11 out. There was no question in my mind from that 
12 point forward at all. 
13 MR. WALL: Did she ever comment on what 
14 your status was other than the letter, other than the 
15 offer? 
16 DAN PEARSON: I didn't have any other 
17 conversations with her. 
18 MR. WOLTHIUS: Go ahead, Greg. 
19 MR. GEILMANN: Before Mr. Skordas begins, 
20 if I could grab that letter, and I will have Phil 
21 make a copy of it. 
22 MR. SKORDAS: You made copies, didn't you? 
23 MR. WOLTHIUS: Of Mr. Skordas's letter of 
24 March 6? 
25 MR. GEILMANN: The memorandum. 
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1 I Signed documents, prepared things. No question about 
2 I it. He lost the election in 1994. I knew that day 
3 that I had lost my job. And I have never worked as a 
4 public servant again. I had a very good job for 
5 seven years; merit, went through the whole 
6 probationary thing, and I understood that. 
7 Similarly with Dan, he worked for Midvale 
8 City, worked his way up. And as an employee there, 
9 he understood that he had merit status. In fact, he 
10 even had a fall-back position, as you would expect 
11 any agency would have, because you want to promote 
12 from within instead of do what happened to me, which 
13 is promote to where you actually lose your better 
14 employees by virtue of some political or other 
15 factor. He had a great job there. He wouldn't have 
16 left that job except for the inducement that he had 
17 at South Jordan City. 
18 Now, let me talk to you a little about 
19 contract law. Any ambiguity, and any lawyer will 
20 tell you this, that ambiguities in a contract are 
21 always held against the drafter of the contract. 
22 That's contract law 101. And it was interesting to 
23 listen to Mr. Horst when he was asked about the first 
24 document here, July 15, 2002. When I asked him, 
25 "Where does it say Dan is an at-will employee," and 
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1 he said, "Well, it doesn't say that he's not," Well, 
2 that's an ambiguity. South Jordan wrote the 
3 contract. They wrote the job description. They 
4 treated him in every way as though he was a 
5 protected, merit employee. They induced him to come 
6 over. 
7 They have the ability, all the brilliant 
8 legal resources in the County to draft contracts and 
9 sit down and say, "You are at-will. You are not. We 
10 will take care of you. You are on your own." But 
11 they didn't. And the law, the basics of the law are 
12 that they should have done that. And to the extent 
13 they didn't, that should be held against them. 
14 They actually, if you read this over, put 
15 him on, as you would expect, a six-month probationary 
16 period. Well, what good would it be to put somebody 
17 on a six-month probationary period if they are an 
18 at-will employee? If they are at-will, aren't they 
19 always on probationary? What difference does it 
20 make? But Dan went through the probationary period. 
21 He passed that. 
22 Every year thereafter they gave him 
23 evaluations. Again, if he is an at-will employee, 
24 why would you do that? What difference does it make? 
25 You can fire him, do anything you want. They treated 
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1 I him in ever respect as a merit employee until he 
2 J turned 50 years old and didn't fit into their 
3 structure. 
4 And again, him leaving South Jordan had 
5 nothing to do with performance, nothing to do with 
6 evaluations, nothing to do with popularity, and 
7 everything to do with money. And I'm telling you, 
8 and I'm not trying to make this as any threat at all 
9 because I'm not an employment lawyer and I don't sue 
10 cities, but South Jordan City is going to get 
11 themselves in a whole lot of trouble if Dan Pearson's 
12 termination is sustained. It is discriminatory. It 
13 is illegal to take someone who is 50 years old and 
14 fire them. Especially if, and this is exactly what 
15 South Jordan did, they replaced him with a young 
16 30-year-old that you can hire at a much lesser rate. 
17 It is also illegal to fire somebody who is 
18 in all respects treated, authorized, and acts as 
19 though they are a protected employee, without giving 
20 them any right of appeal. We are all here having an 
21 appeal in a situation where I suppose the City would 
22 say, "Well, this is all just a waste of time. It is 
23 a legal argument. Sure, he was a great employee. 
24 Sure we loved him. He did a great job. The City 
25 never got sued under his watch. He was great, but he 
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1 doesn't fit in anymore. See you later." Thirty 
2 years of law enforcement walks out the door. Who 
3 cares about you anymore? I hope none of you are 50 
4 and have to deal with Mr. Horst coming back from one 
5 of his yearly trips to St. George, because that type 
6 of stuff just shouldn't be sustained. 
7 I don't want to go through the law because 
8 I think I have done that. The City could have, if 
9 they are so smart and they read the Code and it's 
10 drafted in 2004 and the legislature says the Deputy 
11 Chief of Police is exempt, they could have called him 
12 a Deputy Chief of Police in those intervening three 
13 years but they didn't. Mr. Horst, I believe - and 
14 this is just a personal opinion - lied to you when he 
15 said, "I prefer Deputy Chief of Police. That was the 
16 title I use," because not once in his entire lifetime 
17 has he ever used that. But he is looking back, 
18 trying to cover his bases and trying to justify what 
19 is clearly an illegal act, and say, "Well, he really 
20 was a Deputy Chief of Police." 
21 He wasn't a Deputy Chief of Police. Why 
22 not call him that? If you want to follow the law, 
23 follow the law. If you want to call somebody a 
24 deputy, call him Deputy Chief of Police. Even in his 
25 termination letter, this man who says, "My prevalence 
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1 I is deputy," even in the letter he drafted, he signs, 
2 I he calls Dan Pearson Assistant Chief of Police twice, 
3 and for the first time in history he calls him an 
4 at-will employee to his face. The day he fires him. 
5 There's a way to right this wrong, and 
6 that's to give Dan his job back. And that's what we 
7 would ask you to do. 
8 MR. WOLTHIUS: Thank you, Mr. Skordas. 
9 Mr. Geilmann? 
10 MR. GEILMANN: I have appreciated the 
11 information that has been presented here today. I 
12 hope it has been helpful to you. I need to take just 
13 a few minutes and just make sure that we are all 
14 looking at concepts together. And so going back to 
15 my initial opening, I talked about fruit; that is the 
16 employment concept that we are talking about here. 
17 And we are not talking about a contract employment. 
18 We are not talking about for-cause employment. We 
19 are talking about at-will. We are talking about 
20 fruit that, it doesn't matter what you do or don't do 
21 or how old you are or how old you are not, it doesn't 
22 matter. The bottom line is you are removed from the 
23 tree with literally nothing. Just a change in the 
24 wind, a shake of the tree. It doesn't matter. It 
25 doesn't mean that the fruit is good or bad or bruised 
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Exhibit B 
Employment Contract 
July 15, 2002 
Daniel Pearson 
12146 South 4000 West 
Riverton, Utah 84065 
Dear Daniel: 
FXH1HI1 <*s 
CitiCourt, LLC j 
It is a pleasure to officially extend to you a conditional offer (pending the successful completion 
of medical exams, alcohol and drug tests, and other tests that may be required) of employment 
with South Jordan City. We are looking forward to having you join our team because of the 
outstanding contribution we trust you will make. 
To confirm the details of our discussion, you will start work on MeMayP July 1pr, 2002 at 8:00 
a.m. in the position of Assistant Police Chief. Your supervisor will be Protective Services 
Department Director, Lindsay Shepherd. While a job description will be provided to you as part 
of your New Employee Orientation, in brief, you will be responsible for Police operations. I am 
sure you will find this to be a very challenging and stimulating job. 
Your salary will be paid at the rate of $30.15 per hour/$2,412.00 each two-week pay period 
(Exempt Grade E12, Step 6.5). In addition, you are eligible for all of our standard employee 
benefits. 
We anticipate a long and mutually rewarding relationship. However, you should know that if 
your employment is "at will" (for Probationary Employees and Department Heads) there is no 
obligation on either you or South Jordan City to continue it for any set length of time. All new 
employees are on probation for their first six (6) month period of employment. Passing 
probation, however, does not affect your "at-will" status. Probationary and post-probationary 
"at-will" employees may be terminated at any time without reason or explanation. The main 
difference is that your performance will be monitored more closely during your probationary 
period. 
Again, congratulations. I look forward to seeing you on July 15, 2002. Until then, please 
acknowledge receipt of this job acceptance offer letter by signing this copy and returning it to 
me by July 15, 2002. You will receive a copy of this correspondence on July 15, 2002 when you 
begin work with South Jordan City. If you have any questions, feel free to contact me. 
f Vui^u^/j^^r^ *n Ikfcai 
Shelly Chapman Date 
Human Resource Officer 
for employment with South Jordan City. 
Daniel Pearson 
SOUTWORDAN 
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Exhibit C 
Termination Letters 
pgf/2E107 17:34 2543393 SOUTH JORDAN U1IY 
Mayor^William Kent Money ^^^^mi c ^ Manager-Ricky A. Horst 
Council Mambsr-BrJan C. Bulte/s 
Council Member-David w, Colton 
Council Member-Bradley G, Marior 
Council Member-Larry Short 
Council Member-Leona Winger SOUTH JORDAN 
1600 West Towne Center Drive / South Jordan, UT $4095/ Telephone (801) 254-3742 / Fax (801) 254-3393 
e-mail: info@sjc.utah.gov http://sjc.utah.gov 
Jan. 30,2007 
Daniel Pearson 
Assistant Police Chief 
City of South Jordan 
As the Assistant Police Chief, you are currently employed in an "At-Will" position, from 
which you may be temiinated at any time, with or without cause or explanation. Your 
employment with the City of South Jordan h hereby temiinated, effective at 5:00 pm on 
Jan. 30, 2007. 
Please contact Chief Shepherd and Human Resources to complete out processing. 
^ & C & H ^ 
Ricky A, Horst 
City Manager 
Cc: Human Resources 
File 
Received: Date: 
Daniel Pearson 
*$ 
MAYOR-WILLIAM KENT MONE\ ^rifiRHLt CITY M\N\GCR - Ru K> \ HORST 
COUNCII MrMBrR - BRKN C BUTTERS 
COUNCIL MTMRFR - DAVID W COLTON 
COUNCII MI MIII R - BRADI n G. N'URLOR 
COUNCTI MiMMR-L\mn SHORI 
COUNCII MKMBFR - LFONA WINGER SOUTH JORDAN 
U T J A H 
1600 WEST TOWNE CENTER DRIVE / Sou TH JORDAN. UT 84095 / TELEPHONE (801) 254-3742 / FAX (801) 254-3393 
email: mfoC^sjc utah.gov hup //sjc titah.gov 
February 8, 2007 
Daniel L. Pearson 
12146 South 4000 West 
Riverton,UT 84065 
Re: Request to Appeal 
Dear Mr. Pearson: 
The City is in receipt of your January 30, 2007 letter, which you ask us to consider a "request to 
appeal [your] termination at any and all levels that may apply." You were employed by the City 
as its Assistant Police Chief, an at-will position. The Employee Appeals procedure, outlined by 
statute and the City's Handbook, does not apply to an Assistant Police Chief. See, Utah Code 
Annotated § 10-3-1105(2)(d). There is no appeal available. 
A<tU 
Ricky A. Horst 
City Manager 
Cc: File 
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Exhibit D 
Dan Pearson Grievances 
SREGORY G. SKORDAS, P.C. 
rlARRY CASTON, P.C. 
REBECCA C. HYDE, P.C. 
3LIVIA D. UlTTO 
SKORDAS, CASTON 6£ ttYDE, L1A>. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
341 S O U T H M A I N STREET 
S U I T E 303 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841 1 1 
TELEPHONE(801)53 1-7444 
FACSIMILE ( 8 0 1 ) 531 -8885 
March 6, 2007 
John Geilman 
Assistant City Manager 
1600 W. Towne Center Dr. 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Re: Step Three Grievance 
Dear Assistant City Manager: 
Pursuant to and in accordance with the South Jordan City Grievance Procedures, Daniel 
Pearson, by and through counsel of record, Gregory G. Skordas, hereby submits this Step Three 
(3) Grievance regarding his termination from the position of Assistant Police Chief on January 
30, 2007. 
Grievance Timeline 
1. On January 30, 2007, Ricky A. Horst, South Jordan City Manager, terminated 
Dan Pearson from his position as Assistant Police Chief. 
2. On January 31, 2007, Dan Pearson submitted a letter to South Jordan City entitled 
"Letter of Intent to Appeal Termination," wherein he made a formal request to 
appeal his termination at any and all levels that may apply. 
3. On February 8, 2007, Dan Pearson submitted a letter to both Mr. Horst and 
Lindsay Shepherd, South Jordan Police Chief, again appealing his termination of 
January 30, 2007 and requesting that the grievance procedures be followed. 
4. On February 8, 2007, Mr. Horst responded in a letter to Dan Pearson, wherein he 
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stated: u[T]he employee appeals procedure, outline by statute and the City's 
Handbook, does not apply to an Assistant Police Chief. There is no appeal 
available." 
5. On February 15, 2007, Chief Shepherd responded in a letter to Dan Pearson, 
wherein he stated: "It is my decision, as your former immediate supervisor, to up 
hold your termination." 
Timeliness of Step Three Grievance 
Section 4-07(2)(c) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states the following: 
Step Three - If the employee is not satisfied with the response of the immediate 
supervisor, the employee may submit a written grievance to their respective 
assistant city manager or service group director within 10 working days of the 
immediate supervisor's response. 
Section 4-07(2)(b) and (d), which define steps two (2) and four (4), clarify the 10 working 
day clock as beginning at the time "of receipt" of the correspondence. It would be both 
inconsistent and prejudicial to interpret section 4-07(2)(c) as creating a filing time frame far more 
limiting on aggrieved employees than on city employees responding to the grievance. Indeed, 
interpreting the 10 day clock as beginning on the date of issuance would create an incentive for 
use of first class mail as opposed to fax or hand delivery as a mechanism to limit the amount of 
time the party has to respond. 
In the present case, counsel for Dan Pearson received the letter after the extended 
President's Day weekend, on February 20, 2007. Accordingly, the time for submitting a step 
three grievance extends to March 6, 2007. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reach the same 
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date. Rule 6 begins the computation on the day of mailing, but adds three days to the end of the 
proscribed period. Under that standard, the period of 10 working days also extends to March 6, 
2007. 
Of final note, this Step Three Grievance would have been submitted at a sooner date were 
it not for the ambiguity of Mr. Horst's February 8, 2007, letter, which creates some impression 
that Dan Pearson was being told that he did not qualify for any review procedure whatsoever. 
Grievance of Dan Pearson 
It is hereby argued that South Jordan City Manager Ricky Horst was without authority to 
terminate Dan Pearson in the manner that he did, and that it was wrongful of Chief Lindsay 
Shepherd to uphold that termination. Dan Pearson therefore calls upon the Assistant City 
Manager, John Geilman, to correct the error in accordance with proper procedure. 
The letter written by Mr. Horst on February 8, 2007, and the letter written by Chief 
Shepherd on February 15, 2007, confirm that Dan Pearson's termination was executed on the 
belief and assumption that Dan Pearson was an "at-will" employee of South Jordan City. This 
assumption is in error. 
A. Statutory Classification 
Mr. Horst's February 8, 2007, letter cites Utah Code Ann. 10-3-1105(2)(d) as statutorily 
classifying Dan Pearson as an at-will employee. This section of the Utah Code classifies certain 
individuals as being at-will. Subsection (2)(b), as cited by Mr. Horst, includes a "deputy police 
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chief of the municipality." Dan Pearson, however, was not a deputy police chief at the time of his 
termination. Rather, Dan Pearson was an Assistant Police Chief. This position is distinct and 
separate from a Deputy Police Chief, just as the City currently employs Gary Whatcott as Deputy 
City Manager and John Geilman, Rob Wall and Laurie Tanner as Assistance City Managers. 
Accordingly, the City has failed to identify any statutory basis for claiming that he was an at-will 
employee at the time of his termination. 
B. South Jordan Written Policy 
On July 15, 2002, Dan Pearson accepted the offer for employment as Assistant Police 
Chief. He signed an agreement for employment at that time. That agreement stated the following: 
"However, you should know that if your employment is "at will" (for Probationary 
Employees and Department Heads) there is no obligation on either you or South Jordan 
City to continue it for any set length of time." 
At the time of his termination, Dan Pearson was not a probationary employee, and was not 
a department head. As stated on the current South Jordan City Website: "The Mayor and City 
Council appoint the City Manager and City Attorney . . . [and] [t]he City Manager appoints all 
Department Heads upon the advise and consent of the City Council." The current appointees are 
listed as follows: Ricky A. Horst - City Manager, Rob Wall - Assistant City Manager, John 
Geilman - City Attorney, Lindsay Shepherd - Police Chief, Gary Whatcott - Deputy City Manager, 
Laurie Tanner - Assistant City Manager, and Anna West - City Recorder. This list does not 
include an Assistant Police Chief, nor does Dan Pearson have reason to believe that it ever has. In 
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sum, Dan Pearson was at no time provided, nor did he ever see, documentation that described him 
as an at will employee. 
C. Verbal Representations 
South Jordan City employees generally represented to Dan Pearson at the time of his 
recruitment, hire and throughout his service that after his probationary period he would be a 
tenured, merit employee, and not an at-will employee. In addition, Dan Pearson engaged in 
several conversations with Chief Lindsay Shepherd about Mr. Pearson becoming Police Chief, 
wherein Dan Pearson stated to Chief Shepherd that he lacked interest in the position because he 
did not want up give up his job security. Chief Shepherd made no comments in response that 
indicated that Dan Pearson's belief of current job security was erroneous. 
Based on the above, Dan Pearson requests that the Assistant City Manager carefully 
review the issue of his employment status, in light of the relevant policies, law and representations 
made to him. 
DATED this ( / day of March, 2007. 
SKORDA5, CASTON & HYDE, LLC 
Gre|bryNjr. Skordas 
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FACSIMILE(801)531-8885 
March 19, 2007 
Employee Appeals Board 
City Recorder's Office 
1600 W. Towne Center Dr. 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Re: Step Five Grievance 
Dear Employee Appeals Board: 
Pursuant to and in accordance with the South Jordan City Grievance Procedures, Daniel 
Pearson, by and through counsel of record, Gregory G. Skordas, hereby submits this Step Five 
(5) Grievance regarding his termination from the position of Assistant Police Chief on January 
30, 2007. 
Grievance Timeline 
1. On January 30, 2007, Ricky A. Horst, South Jordan City Manager, terminated 
Dan Pearson from his position as South Jordan Assistant Police Chief. 
2. On January 31, 2007, Dan Pearson submitted a letter to South Jordan City entitled 
"Letter of Intent to Appeal Termination," wherein he made a formal request to 
appeal his termination at any and all levels that may apply. 
3. On February 8, 2007, Dan Pearson submitted a letter to both Mr. Horst and 
Lindsay Shepherd, South Jordan Police Chief, again appealing his termination of 
January 30, 2007, and requesting that the grievance procedures be followed. 
4. On February 8,2007, Mr. Horst responded in a letter to Dan Pearson, wherein he 
stated: "[T]he employee appeals procedure, outline by statute and the City's 
Handbook, does not apply to an Assistant Police Chief. There is no appeal 
available." 
JREGORY G. SKORDAS, P.C. 
JARRY CASTON, P.C. 
tEBECCA C. HYDE, P.C. 
)LIV1A D. UlTTO 
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5. On February 15, 2007, Chief Shepherd responded in a letter to Dan Pearson, 
wherein he stated: "It is my decision, as your former immediate supervisor, to 
uphold your termination." 
6. On March 6, 2007, Dan Pearson submitted a Step 3 Grievance to John Geilman, 
South Jordan Assistant City Manager, requesting review of all prior 
determinations. The letter clearly stated Mr. Pearson's argument with respect to 
his termination of employment. Specifically, the letter detailed three independent 
grounds upon which Mr. Pearson claims he was not an at-will employee. In 
addition, the letter specifically addressed the timeliness of the letter sufficient to 
established the grievance as being filed in a timely manner. 
7. On March 19, 2007, John Geilman responded to the Step Three Grievance. Mr. 
Geilman denied Dan Pearson's grievance on both procedural and substantive 
grounds, first stating that the grievance was untimely and then upholding the 
termination on the grounds that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee. While Mr. 
Geilman's letter purported to comply with Step 4 of the grievance process, which 
requires that the assistant city manager respond in a manner "detailing his/her 
decision," the response held Mr. Pearson's Step 3 Grievance untimely without 
responding to Mr. Pearson's assertion of timeliness. In addition, the response 
upheld Chief Shepherd's finding that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee 
without factual support and without acknowledgment of the arguments raise by 
Mr. Pearson. 
Timeliness of Step Five Grievance 
Section 4-07(2)(e) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states the following: 
Step Five - If the employee is not satisfied with the response of the assistant city 
manager or service group director, and the action involves a termination, 
suspension without pay for more than two days, or involuntary transfer from one 
position to another with less remuneration for any reason, the employee may 
submit a written request to the employee appeals board through the city recorder's 
office within 10 working days of receipt of the assistant city manager or service 
group leader response. 
The Step 4 response from John Geilman was sent and received by fax on March 19, 2007. 
Ten working days of March 19, 2007 is April 2, 2007. This Step 5 Grievance is being submitted 
to the City Recorder's Office on March 21, 2007. 
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Availability of Step 5 Greivance 
As quoted above, the Step 5 Grievance provision allows any employee "not satisfied with 
the [Step 4] response of the assistant city manager" to appeal that decision to the Employee 
Appeals Board. To the extent that Mr. Geilman's Step 4 response purports to extinguish Mr. 
Pearson's right to submit a Step 5 Grievance, Mr. Pearson seeks to appeal that decision to the 
Board as well. Mr. Geilman's response provides no reason for his finding of untimeliness, and 
fails to acknowledge Mr. Pearson's supported assertion that his grievance was in fact timely. 
Moreover, Mr. Geilman gives no support for his implied statement that only a "court of 
competent jurisdiction" may review his determination of untimeliness. Mr. Pearson argues that 
the Employee Appeals Board is more than qualified to review all prior determinations of each 
city employee throughout the grievance process, including determinations of timeliness. Mr. 
Pearson does note, however, that the Board may be aided by consideration of how a local court 
would assess the issue. 
Grievance of Dan Pearson 
It is hereby argued that South Jordan City Manager Ricky Horst was without authority to 
terminate Dan Pearson in the manner that he did, that it was wrongful of Chief Lindsay Shepherd 
to uphold that termination, and that Assistant City Manager John Geilman erred in finding the 
Step 3 Grievance untimely and in upholding all prior determinations. Dan Pearson therefore 
calls upon the Employee Appeals Board to conduct a hearing and review the appropriateness of 
his termination, as specified in the section 4-08 of the South Jordan City Employee Handbook. 
The following briefly outlines Mr. Pearson's arguments in this matter. A more complete 
argument will be offered at the appropriate hearing or through briefing as requested by the Board. 
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A. Timeliness of Step Three Grievance 
Section 4-07(2)(c) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states the following: 
Step Three - If the employee is not satisfied with the response of the immediate 
supervisor, the employee may submit a written grievance to their respective 
assistant city manager or service group director within 10 working days of the 
immediate supervisor's response. 
The above provision alone does not expressly state when the 10 working day clock 
begins; i.e. upon mailing of the letter or upon receipt by the other party. Sections 4-07(2)(b), (d) 
and (e), however, which define steps two (2), four (4) and five (5), clarify the 10 working day 
clock as beginning at the time "of receipt" of the correspondence. Step Five, in particular, grants 
the aggrieved employee ten days after "receipt" of the assistant city managers response, 
demonstrating that the "receipt" based time clock is afforded to both aggrieved employee and city 
respondent. Step One is also consistent with this time calculation in that the action of 
termination is not complete until the employee is notified. 
It would be extremely inconsistent and grossly prejudicial to interpret section 4-07(2)(c) 
as creating a filing time which begins upon the date of mailing. First, the interpretation would 
create an unexplained exception to the rule followed at "all" other steps. Such a "one time" 
exception makes no sense in the context of Step 3 Grievances, and would greatly increase the 
likelihood of innocent error on behalf of the aggrieved party or their counsel. Second, the 
interpretation would place a much greater hardship on aggrieved employees than on the city 
employees responding to their grievances. While city employees would still be granted a full ten 
working days to formulate their reply, the aggrieved party could be forced to submit their Step 3 
Grievance in as little as 5 working days. Third, the interpretation would choose a standard and 
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regulated response time into one dictated by the method of transmitting the decision. Such 
would create an incentive for use of first class mail as opposed to fax or hand delivery as a 
mechanism to limit the amount of time the party has to respond. 
In the present case, counsel for Dan Pearson received the letter after the extended 
President's Day weekend, on February 20, 2007. Accordingly, the time for submitting a step 
three grievance extended to March 6, 2007. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reach the same 
date. Rule 6 begins the computation on the day of mailing, but adds three days to the end of the 
proscribed period. Under that standard, the period of 10 working days also extended to March 6, 
2007. 
B. Wrongfulness of At-Will Determination 
i. Statutory Classification 
Mr. Horst's February 8, 2007, letter cites Utah Code Ann. 10-3-1105(2)(d) as statutorily 
classifying Dan Pearson as an at-will employee. This section of the Utah Code classifies certain 
individuals as being at-will. Subsection (2)(b), as cited by Mr. Horst, includes a "deputy police 
chief of the municipality." Dan Pearson, however, was not a deputy police chief at the time of his 
termination. Rather, Dan Pearson was an Assistant Police Chief. This position is distinct and 
separate from a Deputy Police Chief, just as the City currently employs Gary Whatcott as Deputy 
City Manager and John Geilman, Rob Wall and Laurie Tanner as Assistant City Managers. 
Accordingly, the City has failed to identify any statutory basis for claiming that he was an at-will 
employee at the time of his termination, 
ii. South Jordan Written Policy 
On July 15, 2002, Dan Pearson accepted the offer for employment as Assistant Police 
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Chief He signed an agreement for employment at that time. That agreement stated the following: 
"However, you should know that if your employment is uat will" (for Probationary 
Employees and Department Heads) there is no obligation on either you or South Jordan 
City to continue it for any set length of time." 
At the time of his termination, Dan Pearson was not a probationary employee, and was not 
a department head. As stated on the current South Jordan City Website: "The Mayor and City 
Council appoint the City Manager and City Attorney . . . [and] [t]he City Manager appoints all 
Department Heads upon the advise and consent of the City Council." The current appointees are 
listed as follows: Ricky A. Horst - City Manager, Rob Wall - Assistant City Manager, John 
Geilman - City Attorney, Lindsay Shepherd - Police Chief, Gary Whatcott - Deputy City Manager, 
Laurie Tanner - Assistant City Manager, and Anna West - City Recorder. This list does not 
include an Assistant Police Chief, nor does Dan Pearson have reason to believe that it ever has. In 
sum, Dan Pearson was at no time provided, nor did he ever see, documentation that described him 
as an at will employee. 
iii. Verbal Representations 
South Jordan City employees generally represented to Dan Pearson at the time of his 
recruitment, hire and throughout his service that after his probationary period he would be a 
tenured, merit employee, and not an at-will employee. In addition, Dan Pearson engaged in 
several conversations with Chief Lindsay Shepherd about Mr. Pearson becoming Police Chief, 
wherein Dan Pearson stated to Chief Shepherd that he lacked interest in the position because he 
did not want up give up his job security. Chief Shepherd made no comments in response that 
indicated that Dan Pearson's belief of current job security was erroneous. 
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Based on the above, Dan Pearson requests that the Appeals Board follow the review 
procedures, including the holding of a hearing, and subsequently review the issue of his 
employment status, in light of the relevant policies, law and representations made to him. 
DATED this 2 ' day of March, 2007. 
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE, LLC 
G. Skordas 
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Exhibit E 
Respondent's Denial Letters 
SOUTH JORDAN CITY POLICE DEPAR'i JVIENT 1 2-Ug-QI 
1600 West Towne Center Drive 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Phone: (801) 254-4708 
Fax: (801) 253-2210 
Lindsay D. Shepherd 
Chief of Police 
February 15, 2007 
Daniel L Pearson 
12146 South 4000 West 
Riverton, UT 84065 
Greg Skordus, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Employee Grievance for Action Taken 
Dear Mr Pearson: 
The City is in receipt of your February 8, 2007 letter, in which you serve notice grieving the 
action taken against [you] and demanding that South Jordan City grievance procedure be 
followed. 
This letter is written pursuant to the South Jordan City Employee Grievance Procedure, and is a 
response to your grievance. The facts detailing my decision regarding your grievance are that 
you were employed by South Jordan City as an Assistant Police Chief, an appointed at will 
employee. Based on those facts, it is my decision, as your former immediate supervisor, to up 
hold your termination as an appointed-at will employee. 
'674/44 
i^ clsay Shepherd 
ief of Police 
C: File 
\fa\or W illiam k \{OIK\ 
Cit* \ Jam sti Rick\ \ Hor<=t 
MAYOR - WILLIAM KENT MONEY ^ f l R H L C l T Y MANAGER - KICKY A HOK5 I 
COUNCIL MEMBER BRIAN C BUTTERS 
COUNCIL MEMBER DAVID W COLTON 
COUNCIL MI MBI K BRADIEYG MARIOR 
COUNCIL MI MBFR LARR\ SHORI 
COUNCIL MEMBER LFONA WINGER SOUTH JORDAN receiy fi 1600 WEST TOWNE CENTER DRIVE / SOUTH JORDAN UT 84095 / TELEPHONE (801) 254 3742 / FAX («OI) 254 3393 
email info@sjc Utah go\ http //sjc Utah gov 
March 19, 2007 
Daniel L. Pearson 
12146 South 4000 West 
Riverton, UT 84065 
Greg Skordus, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City,UT 84111 
Re: Employee Grievance for Action Taken 
Dear Mr. Pearson and Mr. Skordus: 
This letter is notice that the grievance for action taken filed on March 6, 2007 with the 
Office of the undersigned as Step Three of the South Jordan City Employee Grievance 
Procedure by Mr. Daniel L, Pearson was not timely filed. Therefore, this Office does not 
deem a response to be required to the untimely filed grievance. Further, due to the 
untimely filing of the grievance by Mr. Daniel L. Pearson, the grievance process has been 
completed and Step Four and Step Five of the City Grievance Procedure are not available 
to Mr. Pearson. 
In the alternative, should a court of competent jurisdiction rule that Mr. Pearson's Step 
Three response was timely filed, and that Mr. Pearson is entitled to proceed to Step Four 
of the South Jordan City Employee Grievance Procedure, the following is given only to 
preserve the City's right to proceed to Step Four of the said Grievance Procedure and to 
respond to Mr. Pearson's grievance accordingly. 
The Office of the undersigned was at the time relevant to the separation of Mr. Pearson 
from the employ of South Jordan City the Office of the Assistant City Manager over the 
Health, Safety and Legal Group, The Police Department was attached to this Group and 
thus the requirement in Step Three of the South Jordan City Employee Grievance 
Procedure would require Mr. Pearson to address a grievance to the undersigned. 
I am in receipt of Mr. Pearson's grievance dated March 6,2007 wherein, among other 
things, Mr. Pearson's Counsel asks that the "Assistant City Manager carefully review the 
issue of [Mr. Pearson's] employment status, in light of the relevant policies, law and 
representations made to [Mr. Pearson]". 
DISCIPLINED THOUGHT • DISCIPLINED PEOPLE • DISCIPLINED ACTION 
Step Four of the South Jordan City Employee Grievance Procedure requires a written 
response to be submitted to the employee grievance within 10 working days of receipt of 
the grievance. The grievance was received by the undersigned's Office on March 6, 
2007. Ten working days, including the day of receipt of the grievance, is March 19, 
2007. 
The legal alternative contained in this letter is written pursuant to Step Four of the South 
Jordan City Employee Grievance Procedure, and is a response to Mr. Pearson's 
grievance. The facts detailing my decision regarding Mr. Pearson's grievance are that he 
was employed by South Jordan City as an Assistant Police Chief, an appointed at will 
employee. Based on those facts, it is my decision, as Mr. Pearson's former Assistant City 
Manager, to up hold his termination as an appointed at will employee. 
^/John H. Geilmann 
Assistant City Manager 
C: File 
Camille N. Johnson 
U*d/13/'ZUUf 13: bd ^ o q j d ^ j 1 1 1 «->«-
Mayar-WIlIiam KGHI Mcnsy 
Council Member-Brian G. Butters 
Cooncfl Merrfcer-Oavid W. Cotton 
Council Msmbor-Bradley & Marior 
Cot/ncH Manser-Larry Short 
Council Member-Leona Winger 
City Manager-Ricky A, Horst 
SoOTtrlORDAN 
\ 600 West Towne Center Drive / South Jordan, UT 84095/ Telephone (801) 254-3742 / Fax (801) 254-3393 
e-mail infe@slc.ulah.gov hflptfsjc.utati.gov 
April 30,2007 
, - : • - - . - • < : • • / - > rf^r^-.y, Anna West 
South Jordan City Recorder 
Re: Grievance of Daniel Pearson 
Dear Anna: 
Please be advised that "the Employee Appeals Board of South Jordan City has 
deliberated regarding the grievance fled by Daniel Pearson and has reached a decision. 
Based upon the grievance filed, the Board determined that there were two issues for the 
Board's consideration. The conclusion of the Board is as follows: 
1. Was the grievance filed in a tjmely fashion as required by the South Jordan 
City Employee Handbook? The Board determined that the grievance was 
timely filed. 
2. Was Daniel Pearson an "at will" employee? The Board a t^ermraed that Mr. 
Pearson was an "at wilT employee. 
5y each, of 
above^results. 
'attires below, the respective board members certify to the 
e/u*^f A*. A / 4 * * 3 * * -
)NALD C. WOLTHUIS 
SUZAipJERUAKK: 
SUNILNAIDU 
IALL 
DISCIPLINED THOUGHT • DISCIPLINED 
Exhibit F 
Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Summary Disposition 
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (5494) 
JUDITH D. WOLFERTS (7023) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Respondent 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5000 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Fax:(801)363-0400 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
WEST JORDAN, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL PEARSON, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
Appellant, MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION OF APPEAL 
vs. 
Case No. 070418144 
CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN, 
Judge Terry Christiansen 
Respondent. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Respondent City of South Jordan (the "City") submits this memorandum in support of its 
Motion for Summary Disposition. The City's Motions asks the Court to dismiss appellant Daniel 
Pearson's ("Mr. Pearson") appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
INTRODUCTION 
This "appeal" involves a terminated City employee, Daniel Pearson, whose employment 
was at-will and who accordingly had no statutory due process appeal rights. Disregarding this 
lack of statutory rights, Mr. Pearson has attempted to parlay a grievance procedure that is 
contained in the City's Employee Handbook into a right to judicial appellate review of the City's 
Employee Appeals Board's decision that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee. The Utah Court 
of Appeals has already rejected Mr. Pearson's approach and found that it has no jurisdiction over 
such review. This court should likewise find that it has no jurisdiction over Mr. Pearson's 
Petition for Review of the Employee Appeals Board's actions, since none of the jurisdictional 
bases for a district court's appellate review are present. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In July 2002, Mr. Pearson was hired by the City as assistant chief of police. See 
Conditional Offer of Employment (July 15, 2002), attached as Ex. A. 
2. Under the City's job description, an assistant police chief is second in command 
in the police department and has general supervisory authority over all department personnel: 
General Purpose 
Assumes total responsibility for the [police] department in the absence of the 
Public Safety Director; assists in the development of departmental programs; 
performs various administrative and managerial duties as assigned by the Chief. 
Supervision Received 
Works under the broad guidance and direction of the Public Safety Director. 
Assumes departmental responsibility in the absence of the Chief of Police. 
Supervision Exercised 
Provides general supervision to all department personnel, directly or through 
subordinate supervisors. 
See Job Description, Assistant Police Chief, attached as Ex. B; see also South Jordan City Police 
Department Employment Chart, attached as Ex. C. 
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3. On January 30, 2007, Mr. Pearson was terminated from his position as assistant 
police chief. See Termination Letter (Jan. 30, 2007), attached as Ex. D. The letter of termination 
stated that he was an at-will employee. See id. 
4. Utah statutes dictate which municipal employment positions have due process 
rights, as opposed to those which are at-will and do not have due process rights. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 10-3-1105 &-1106. 
5. Under Utah law, a "deputy police chief and a "deputy of the head of a municipal 
department" are at-will employees and have no entitlement to due process upon termination: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold 
employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge, suspension of over 
two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as 
provided in Section 10-3-1106.l 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
(a) a police chief of the municipality; 
(b) a deputy police chief of the municipality; 
(g) a head of a municipal department; 
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department; 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. 
6. The day after he was terminated, Mr. Pearson sent the City a GRAMA request for 
a copy of his personnel file, a copy of the City's Employee Handbook, and copies of all sections 
]The Utah legislature has specified the due process entitlements of municipal employee 
positions that are not at will, which includes an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from "any 
final action or order of [a municipality's] appeal board." See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(a). 
in 
of the City's Police Department Policies and Procedures Manual that refer to, among other 
things, terminations and appeals of termination. See GRAMA Request from Pearson (Jan. 31, 
2007), attached as Ex. E. 
7. The day after he was terminated, Mr. Pearson also delivered to the City a letter 
regarding his "Notice of Intent to Appeal Termination." See Notice of Intent Letter (Jan. 31, 
2007), attached as Ex. F. 
8. On February 8, 2007, Mr. Pearson faxed to the City a letter regarding "Notice of 
Appeal, Grievance and Legal Representation." See Notice of Appeal (Feb. 8, 2007), attached as 
Ex. G. The letter stated that it was an appeal of his termination, and that if an appeal was refused 
the letter was notice of his intention to grieve his termination under the City's grievance 
procedure: 
Dear Sirs: 
Pursuant to South Jordan City Policy, I am formally appealing my 
termination of January 30, 2007. I am also notifying you that if you refuse to 
grant me the appeal I am entitled to, I hereby notify you that this letter will serve 
as my notice grieving the action taken against me and demanding that the South 
Jordan City grievance procedure be followed. 
See id. (emphasis added). 
9. The City sent a letter to Mr. Pearson on February 8, 2007, which stated it had 
received his request for an appeal, but that the appeals procedure in the Employee Handbook did 
not apply to him because his position as assistant police chief was at-will. Letter to Pearson from 
Ricky Horst (City Manager) (Feb. 8, 2007), attached as Ex. H. 
10. On or about March 19, 2007, Mr. Pearson's attorney sent a letter to the Employee 
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Appeals Board in which he detailed the "grievance timeline" process that Mr. Pearson had 
followed since his termination. See Letter from Gregory Skordas to Employee Appeals Board 
(dated Mar. 21, 2007), attached as Ex. I. The "timeline" in the letter noted that Mr. Pearson was 
at the final step ("step 5") in the grievance pursuant to § 4-07(2)(e) of the City's Employee 
Handbook. See id, 
11. Section 4-07(2)(e) of the City's Employee Handbook states that: 
Step Five-If the employee is not satisfied with the response of the assistant city 
manager or service group director, and the action involves a termination, 
suspension without pay for more than two days, or involuntary transfer from one 
position to another with less remuneration for any reason, the employee may 
submit a written request to the employee appeals board through the city recorder's 
office within 10 working days of receipt of the assistant city manager or service 
group leader response. 
See Employee Handbook, § 4-07, attached as Ex. J. 
12. The Employee Appeals Board agreed to hear the grievance to address the at-will 
issue. Mr. Pearson was permitted to call witnesses at the hearing, and he testified on his own 
behalf The Board concluded he was an at-will employee. See Decision of Grievance of Daniel 
Pearson, attached as Ex. K. 
13. On May 10, 2007, Mr. Pearson filed a Petition in the Utah Court of Appeals for 
review of the Employee Appeals Board's decision. See Petition for Review (May 10, 2007), 
attached as Ex. L. The Petition stated the jurisdictional basis for appeal as Utah R.App. P. 14 
and Rule 4-08(4)(c) of the City's Employee Handbook. See id. 
14. Rule 4-08(4)(c) of the City's Employee Handbook states: 
v 
Decision of Employee Appeals Board Hearing 
a. Each decision of the employee appeals board shall be certified to the city 
recorder within 15 days from the final day of the appeals hearing . . . . 
b. In the event the employee appeals board does not uphold the suspension, 
demotion or termination, the city recorder shall certify the decision to the 
employee affected, and also to the assistant city manager or service group 
director from whose order the appeal was taken. If the board does not 
uphold the suspension, demotion or termination, the board shall provide in 
its order: 
c. Any final action or order of the board may be appealed by either the employee or 
the City to the Utah Court of Appeals . . . 
Employee Handbook § 4-08, attached as Ex. M. 
15. Mr. Pearson's Petition to the Utah Court of Appeals asked the court to review the 
Employee Appeals Board's "decision that [Mr. Pearson] was an at will employee at the time of 
his termination from the position of South Jordan City Assistant Police Chief" See Petition for 
Review. 
16. On September 10, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued an Order on its own motion. 
See Order (Sept. 10, 2007), attached as Ex. N. The Order states that pursuant to Utah R.App.P. 
44, the Court of Appeals does not have appellate jurisdiction. See id. 
17. The Court of Appeals transferred the Petition for Review to Third District Court 
in West Jordan. See Remittitur (Sept. 10, 2007), attached as Ex. O. 
vi 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOUND IT HAS NO JURISDICTION 
OVER REVIEW OF THE EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD'S DECISION. 
The Court of Appeals correctly found it has no jurisdiction under Utah R.App.P. 14 over 
Mr. Pearson's Petition for Review. Rule 14 states that judicial review by the Supreme Court and 
Court of Appeals of orders or decision of administrative agencies, commissions or committees is 
allowed only when such review is "provided by statute." See Utah R.App.P. 14(a). By its 
decision, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that there is no statute on which it can rely for 
jurisdiction to review the Employee Appeals Board's decision. Mr. Pearson was employed by 
the City as assistant police chief. As such, he was excluded under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 
from the right to due process, and also excluded from the right to judicial review set forth in § 
10-3-1106. Moreover, §§ 10-3-1105 and -1106 apply only to terminations, suspensions without 
pay of more than two days, and involuntary transfers to a position with less remuneration. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(1). They do not apply to decisions as to whether an employee is at-
will, which was the issue before the Employee Appeals Board. See id. Accordingly, there was 
no statutory basis for judicial review by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
II. THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER MR. PEARSON'S PETITION 
FOR REVIEW. 
Just like the Court of Appeals, this Court also has no jurisdiction to review a decision of 
the City's Employee Appeals Board. A district court's appellate jurisdiction is set forth in the 
Utah Code, which states that: 
1 
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review: 
(a) agency adjudicative procedures as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that 
chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative procedures; and 
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10-3-
703.7. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (Jurisdiction of District Court/Appeals). Thus, the district court's 
appellate review jurisdiction applies broadly only to state agencies, and with regard to 
municipalities applies only to review of "an adjudicative hearing for a violation of a civil 
municipal ordinance." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4; § 10-3-703.7; § 64-46b-l; § 63-46b-2(b). 
Mr. Pearson's Petition for Review does not meet these standards. 
First, with regard to the jurisdiction2 established by part (7)(a) of the statute, "agency" is 
defined in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") to include only state agencies: 
"Agency" means a board, commission, department, division, officer, council, 
office, committee, bureau, or other administrative unit of this state, including the 
agency head, agency employees, and other persons acting on behalf of or under 
the authority of the agency head, but does not mean the legislature, the courts, the 
governor, any political subdivision of the state, or any administrative unit of a 
political subdivision of the state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2 (emphasis added) (APA definitions); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-1 (setting forth actions of state agencies that are reviewable). Thus, this Court cannot rely 
on Part 7(a) to establish jurisdiction over Mr. Pearson's Petition for Review of the City's 
2The APA makes clear that "Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an 
independent basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1(8). 
2 
Employee Appeals Board's decision. 
Second, the jurisdiction established by part 7(b) applies only to reviews of "municipal 
administrative proceedings," and the Employee Appeals Board's decision does not fall within 
that definition. The "municipal administrative proceeding" set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
703.7 is defined as "an adjudicative hearing for a violation of a civil municipal ordinance." Id. § 
10-3-703.7(1). Mr. Pearson does not allege a violation of a "civil municipal ordinance"; the only 
issue here is a procedure set forth in the City's Employee Handbook. Indeed, an Employee 
Handbook does not even meet the requirements to be a "municipal ordinance" as set forth in 
§§ 10-3-701 through -719. For example, the statute requires that the "administrative proceeding" 
to be reviewed must have been conducted by an administrative law judge (see id. § 10-3-
703.7(2)(b)), which did not occur with Mr. Pearson because the Employee Appeals Board 
conducted the hearing. 
Finally, although the Employee Handbook states that appeal can be to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, that applies only with regard to employees with a due process right under Utah Code 
Ann. S 10-3-1106. As assistant police chief, Mr. Pearson does not have that statutory right, 
which the Utah Court of Appeals implicitly recognized by finding it had no jurisdiction over his 
Petition for Review. Furthermore, there is no Utah case law that states that an employee 
handbook can be a source of subject matter jurisdiction for appellate review, even when the 
handbook is that of a municipality. 
3 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the City asks this Court to dismiss Mr. Pearson's Petition for 
Review due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Dated this of December, 2007. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
ison 
Judith D. Wolferts 
Attorneys for City of South Jordan 
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Exhibit G 
List of South Jordan Appointed Positions 
Monday, March 5 1 57 PM j Current Weather 47 • F jjfr Mostly Cloudy 
City 
Government 
Planning & ^| 
Development 
Public Safety' City Services M Leisure 
Services 
| Home| City Calendar | Contact Us [ Links] Whats New |FAQ| Help Desk i About South v| Jordan Water Issues ' E Gov& Online 
wvmmm 
Home • City Government • | Elected and Appointed Officials | 
For More Info 
City Hall 
1600 W ioy ne Center Dr 
Soulr> Jurdan Utah840°5 
(801) 446 HELP 
infoi?s{c utah go/ 
Related Links 
G3 City Council 
23 City Government 
©Ci ty Organization Chart 
O Elections 
[^Municipal Code 
2 Please take out 
website survey 
Elected and Appointed Officials 
South Jordan City currently operates under the Council / 
Manager form of government View the organizational 
chart 
The elected officials in office are 
• Mayor W Kent Money 
• Council Member Larry Short (Districts) 
• Council Member Bradley G Marlor (District 2) 
• Council Membei Brian C Butters (District 3) 
• Council Member Leona Winger (District o 
• Council Member David W Colton (District 4) 
IE View a map of district boundaries 
The Mayor and City Council appoint the City Manager fr City Attorney The City Manager appoints all 
Department Heads upon the advise and consent of the City Council 
The current appointees are 
City Manager 
Assistant City Manager 
City Attorney 
Police Chief 
Deputy City Manager 
Assistant City Manager 
City Recorder 
Ricky A Horst 
Rob Wall 
John Geilman 
Lindsay Shepherd 
Gary Whatcott 
Laurie Tanner 
Anna West 
\sl City Manager and Senior Staff 
You can also access contact information for any elected or appointed official 
Copyright Q 2007 City of South Jordan Utah All nghts reserved 
3/5/2007 
Exhibit H 
Assistant Police Chief Job Description 
South Jordan City 
Job Description 
(Title: 
Department: 
Division: 
Classification: 
Assistant Police Chief 
Public Safety 
Police 
Exempt 
Code: 
Effective Date: 
Last Revised: 
Pay Scale: 
POL006 
03/2002 j 
02/2004 
Grade P-14 
GENERAL PURPOSE 
Assumes total responsibility of the department in the absence of the Public Safety Director; assists in the 
development of departmental programs; performs various administrative and managerial duties as assigned by the 
Chief. 
SUPERVISION RECEIVED 
Works under the broad guidance and direction of the Public Safety Director. Assumes departmental responsibility 
in the absence of Chief of Police. 
SUPERVISION EXERCISED 
Provides general supervision to all department personnel, directly or through subordinate supervisors. 
ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS 
Assists the Public Safety Director in department budget preparation by projecting anticipated purchases and project 
costs related to personnel needs, training and technical equipment; monitors compliance with established budgets 
and fiscal guidelines; acts as department procurement officer, prepares bid specifications for various department 
purchases; searches funding alternatives and writes applications for grants; administers grant programs under the 
direction of the police chief; reviews and approves all purchase orders and requisition forms; orders equipment and 
supplies. 
Assists Public Safety Director in personnel matters such as recruitment, selection, promotion, transfers and 
disciplinary actions; coordinate oral review boards; conducts performance evaluations on positions reporting directly 
to the lieutenant; oversees quality of overall departmental performance management functions. 
Monitors departmental compliance with established standard operating procedures; assists in the development and 
implementation of quality control guidelines; makes recommendations for changes in policies and procedures and 
implements changes upon approval; serves as department internal affairs investigator; processes and resolves all 
charges and allegations brought against department personnel. 
Writes general orders and interdepartmental communications as needed and as directed by the Chief of Police; 
oversees, performs or delegates the preparation of departmental duty roster and verifies that shifts have been 
properly filled. 
Develops in-house training curriculum to promote the enhancement of officer knowledge, skills and abilities; 
maintains records of training completed by personnel; oversees department FTO program for new hires; conducts 
traffic school for violators. 
Acts as press release officer; screens and reviews all police reports and communications to assure compliance with 
department policy, decisions and protocol: monitors general activities of the department to assure compliance with 
standard operating procedures; represent Police Department at public meetings as necessary; communicates city 
concerns and needs; delivers city position on issues affecting multiple jurisdictions; sets on regional/county training 
board; acts as member of district school safety council. 
Responds to all major incidents; commands department special response team; may manage an investigative case 
load of major felony crimes; handles rape and homicide cases; follows-up and insures completion of all cases; 
Assistant Police Chief, page2 
assures timely delivery of case documents to county attorney or courts; conducts research and pursues clues, makes 
telephone calls, tracks criminal histories, secures existing information on suspects, etc.; apprehends and arrests 
suspects. 
As needed and in the absence of the sergeant, exercises close supervision over patrol units and investigation 
personnel; monitors work in divisions such as daily incidents, arrests and bookings to ensure compliance with 
established procedures; review reports and booking records; provide back-up to patrol division as necessary; 
receives and investigates citizen complaints against police officers; supervise and participate in major criminal 
investigations as necessary. 
Represent Police Department at public meetings as necessary; communicates city concerns and needs; delivers city 
position on issues affecting multiple jurisdictions. 
Coordinates local, state, and federal law enforcement programs. Makes final recommendation on development of 
departmental policies and procedures formulated on the basis of relevant research. 
Performs various administrative and managerial duties as assigned by the Chief. 
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS 
Education and Experience: 
A. A Bachelors degree or equivalent credit hours in law enforcement or related discipline; plus successful 
completion of Police Officers Standards and Training Academy (POST); 
AND 
B. Ten (10) years of experience in law enforcement, two (2) years of which must have been as a lieutenant or 
ten (10) years as a sergeant. 
OR 
C. An equivalent combination of education and experience. 
Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities: 
Policy terminology and practices; municipal and state laws; City and Department policies and procedures; 
management, instruction, and supervisory techniques; budgeting, planning and problem solving techniques. 
Great responsibility of the care, condition, and use of materials, equipment, money, and tools, and for making 
decisions which affect the activities of others; responsible for Police Captains, Lieutenants, Sergeants, Officers, and 
non-sworn employees; planning, organizing, and delegating all departmental assignments and responsibilities; 
departmental costs and cost methods; acting as an incident officer at hostage situations. 
Ability to professionally furnish and obtain information form other departments; frequent contacts with executives 
on matters requiring explanation and discussions; contacts with other enforcement agencies; regular and frequent 
outside contact with persons of high rank, requiring tact and judgment to deal with and influence people; frequent 
contact with press and community groups; requires well developed sense of strategy and timing. 
Work Environment: 
Great mental effort is required daily: great pressure and fatigue are present in this position due to daily exposure to 
deadlines and other job related pressures; occasional exposure to dangerous situations; constant attendance is 
required; organize own work, virtual self-supervision. 
Applicant must pass a drug test before hire. South Jordan City does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, 
national origin, gender, religion, age or disability. South Jordan City is an Equal Opportunity Employer. 
Exhibit I 
Black's Law Definition of Deputy 
deprived child 
deprived child. See CHILD. 
Deprizio doctrine. Bankruptcy. The rule that a debtor's 
payment to an outside creditor more than 90 days 
before a bankruptcy filing is voidable as a preferen-
tial transfer if it benefits an inside creditor. Levtt v. 
Ingersoll Rand Fin Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. 
Co.), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). [Cases: Bank-
ruptcy <s=>2608(2). CJ.S. Bankruptcy §§ 138-139.] 
de procedendo ad judicium (dee proh-sa-den-doh ad 
joo-dish-ee-am), n. [Law Latin "for proceeding in an 
assize'*] Hist. A chancery writ ordering a lower court 
to proceed to judgment in a case that had been 
wrongfully stayed. « If the lower-court justices re-
fused, they could be punished for contempt. 
de proprietate probanda (dee pre-pn-a-tay-tee pra-
ban-da), n. [Law Latin "for proving property"] Hist. 
A writ ordering a sheriff to investigate the ownership 
of distrained goods claimed by a defendant in a 
replevin action. 
"If therefore the distrainor claims any such property, the 
party replevying must sue out a writ de proprietate proban-
da, in which the sheriff is to try, by an inquest, in whom the 
property previous to the distress subsisted. And if it be 
found to be in the distreinor, the sheriff can proceed no 
farther; but must return the claim of property to the court of 
king's bench or common pleas, to be there farther prose-
cuted, if thought advisable, and there finally determined." 3 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 
148(1768). 
depublished opinion. See OPINION (l). 
depute, n. Scots law. A person appointed to act in an 
official capacity or as another official's representa-
tive. 
deputy, n. A person appointed or delegated to act as a 
substitute for another, esp. for an official [Cases: 
Officers and Public Employees <S=>47. CJ.S. Officers 
and Public Employees §§ 350-351, 353.] — deputize, 
depute, vb. 
courtroom deputy. The deputy clerk assigned to a 
particular courtroom or a particular judge. 
general deputy. 1. A deputy appointed to act in 
another officer's place and execute all ordinary 
functions of the office. [Cases: Officers and Public 
Employees <s=>47. CJ.S. Officers and Public Employ-
ees §§ 350-351, 353.] 2. See deputy sheriff under 
SHERIFF. 
special deputy. A deputy specially appointed to 
serve a particular purpose, such as keeping the 
peace during a riot 
deputy sheriff. See SHERIFF. 
DEQ. abbr DELIVERED EX QUAY. 
de quarantina habenda (dee kwahr-an-ti-ne ha-ben-
da), n, [Law Latin "of return of quarantine"] Hist. A 
writ ordering a sheriff to give a widow possession of 
part of her husband's estate, after she had been 
wrongfully ejected but before dower is assigned. See 
QUARANTINE (4). 
de quo (dee kwoh). [Latin] Of which. © These were 
formal words used in a writ of entry, as in a writ of 
entry "in the quo" or "in the quibus." — Also termed 
de quibus. 
de raptu virginum (dee rap-t[y]oo vs 
in "of the ravishment of virgins' 
taking an appeal in a rape case. 
de rationabilibus divisis (dee rash-£ 
sis), n [Law Latin "of the fixi 
boundaries"] Hist. A writ to sett; 
between property owners of diffc 
one Owner claimed a trespass by th 
de rationabili parte bonorum (dee n 
pahr-tee ba-nor-am), n. [Law Lat 
share of goods"] Hist. A writ allo\ 
children of a dead man to recc 
share of his goods from his execut 
were paid. • This writ was usu. fo 
rather than the general law. 
de recenti (dee ri-sen-ti). [Law Latin] 
ly. © The term adds weight to a 
made or an event (such as an a 
soon after an incident. In a theft < 
the presumption of guilt was grea 
pect was identified soon after th 
de recordo et processu mittendis (c 
proh-ses-[y]oo mi-ten-dis), n. [La 
sending of the record and proces 
superior court"] A type of writ of ei 
derecho de autor. See AUTHOR'S RIGHT. 
de recto (dee rek-toh), n. [Law Latin] 
recover both the seisin and the ] 
termed breve de recto. See WRIT OF COL 
de recto de advocatione (dee rek-to 
shee-oh-nee), n. [Law Latin "of th< 
son"] Hist. A writ restoring a perse 
ent a clerk to a benefice when thz 
interfered with. • It was abolished 
4, ch. 27. 
de recto de rationabili parte (dee r 
[ee]-8-nay-ba-h pahr-tee), n, [Law ' 
reasonable part"] Hist. A writ allowi 
er or blood relative owning land 
obtain a rightful share from the 
abolished by St. 3 & 4 Will 4, ch. 2' 
de recto patens (dee rek-toh pay-ten 
"of right patent"] Hist The high 
under the law given to an owner 
recover the possession and use ( 
freehold tenant. — Also termed 
recto. 
de redisseisina (dee ree-dis-see-zin-< 
"of redisseisin"] Hist. A writ for re 
rent by a person who had previou 
land or rent by an assize of novel 
was again disseised by the same dis 
is similar to de post disseisina. See I 
DISSEISIN. 
deregistration, n. The poinl at whid 
tration under § 12 of the Securitie 
1934 is no longer required becau 
the number of holders of the issu 
USCA § 78/. Cf DELISTING. [Cases: 
tion <s>35.22. CJ.S Seem 
§§ 112-114.] — deregister, vb. 
Addenda 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 
U.C.A. 1953 §§10-3-1105 
Municipal employees—Duration and termination of employment— Exceptions 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold employment 
without limitation of time, being subject to discharge, suspension of over two days without pay, or 
involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as provided, in Section 10-3-1106. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising executive power in the 
municipality; 
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department who is a member of the 
classified civil service in a first or second class city; 
(c) a police chief of the municipality; 
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality; 
(e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality; 
(g) a head of a municipal department; 
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department; 
(i) a superintendent; 
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality; 
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or 
(1) a seasonal employee of the municipality. 
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a municipality's ability to 
define cause for an employee termination or reduction in force. 
U.C.A. 1953 §§ 10-3-1106 
Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer— Appeals—Board—Procedure 
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended without pay, 
or involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration: 
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or 
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or heads of departments. 
(2)(a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or involuntarily 
transferred from one position to another with less remuneration for any reason, the employee may, 
subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a 
board to be known as the appeal board, established under Subsection (7). 
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall exhaust the 
employee's rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board. 
(3)(a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the 
municipal recorder within ten days after: 
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee receives notice of the final 
disposition of the municipality's internal grievance procedure; or 
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the discharge, suspension, or 
involuntary transfer. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a 
copy of the appeal to the appeal board. 
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall forthwith commence 
its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the 
cause for the discharge, suspension, or transfer. 
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may: 
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel; 
(b) have a public hearing; 
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and 
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board. 
(5)(a)(i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the 
recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it, except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii). 
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum 
of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent. 
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the employee shall receive: 
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is discharged or suspended 
without pay; or 
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was transferred to a position of 
less remuneration. 
(6)(a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing 
with that court a petition for review. 
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final 
action or order of the appeal board. 
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the purpose of 
determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority. 
(7)(a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, the number of members, 
the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of 
review shall be prescribed by the governing body of each municipality by ordinance. 
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-mayor form under 
Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal Government, an ordinance adopted under 
Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board. 
U.C.A. § 77-23a-8 
Court order to authorize or approve interception—Procedure 
(1) The attorney general of the state, any assistant attorney general specially designated by the attorney 
general, any county attorney, district attorney, deputy county attorney, or deputy district attorney 
specially designated by the county attorney or by the district attorney, may authorize an application to a 
judge of competent jurisdiction for an order for an interception of wire, electronic, or oral 
communications by any law enforcement agency of the state, the federal government or of any political 
subdivision of the state that is responsible for investigating the type of offense for which the application 
is made. 
U.C.A. § 78A-4-103. 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and 
process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or 
appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the 
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of 
Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of a 
first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or 
serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the 
sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may 
certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the 
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G, Chapter 4, Administrative 
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
